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Neopatrimonialism Revisited − Beyond a Catch-All Concept 
 
 
Abstract 
The article provides a critical discussion of the literature on “patrimonialism” and 
“neopatrimonialism” as far as the use in Development Studies in general or African Stud-
ies in particular is concerned. To overcome the catch-all use of the concept the authors 
present their own definition of “neopatrimonialism” based on Max Weber’s concept of 
patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy. However, in order to make the concept 
more useful for comparative empirical research, they argue, it needs a thorough opera-
tionalisation (qualitatively and quantitatively) and the creation of possible subtypes 
which, in combination, might contribute to a theory of neopatrimonial action. 
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Neopatrimonialismus – quo vadis?  
Der Artikel unterzieht die beiden Konzepte „Patrimonialismus“ und „Neopatrimonialis-
mus“, wie sie in der entwicklungstheoretischen Literatur und in Afrikastudien Verwen-
dung finden, einer kritischen Analyse. Damit dem Konzept des Neopatrimonialismus 
mehr als nur eine heuristische Bedeutung zukommen kann, präsentieren die Autoren eine 
eigene Definition des Begriffs, die sich eng an die Weber’schen Konzepte des Patrimonial-
ismus und der legal-rationalen Bürokratie anlehnt. Darüber hinaus ist auf dieser Grund-
lage (1) eine sorgfältige (qualitative und/oder quantitative) Operationalisierung des Kon-
zeptes und (2) die Bildung von möglichen Subtypen notwendig. Erst dann kann das Kon-
zept sinnvoll für die vergleichende empirische Forschung eingesetzt und möglicherweise 
etwas wie eine neopatrimoniale Handlungstheorie entwickelt werden.  Article Outline 
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2.  “Patrimonialism” and “Neopatrimonialism” Revisited 
3. Neopatrimonialism  Redefined 
4. Conceptual  Elaboration 
5. Perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
“Neopatrimonialism” is a commonly used concept in political science1. A survey of the Inter-
national Political Science Abstracts indicates a wide range of articles and monographs that refer 
in one way or another to the concept in a whole variety of different contexts: from Latin 
America to the Middle and Far East; to the former communist empire; and to southern 
Europe. Recent publications also indicate a renaissance of its application in African Studies 
(cf. Bratton & van de Walle 1997, Erdmann 2002a, 2002b, van de Walle 2001, Englebert 2000, 
Chabal & Daloz 1999). Neopatrimonialism is indeed a universal concept, although one that 
has received little critical analysis, in particular of its appropriateness for understanding Af-
rican politics. It is also not a cut-and-dried concept; in fact it is not far off the mark to say that 
there is no general understanding of what it is all about. Instead there is a mute culture of 
acceptance of the concept with the result that there is a general impression that we have a 
fairly homogenous understanding in some quarters of African Studies (see, for instance, 
Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62); while scholars working with a rational choice or a Marxist 
orientation would not subscribe to the concept, although they hardly discuss it. This uncriti-
                                                      
1  We would like to thank Matthew Braham for his assistance in improving our English as well as for 
his substantial comments on the text.  Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  6 
cal attitude has prevented the development of a controversial and methodologically fruitful 
debate about the meaning and usefulness of “neopatrimonialism”. Thus, Theobald’s warning 
of the early 1980s still holds true:  
“rather than isolating a socio-political phenomenon, it tends to gloss over substantial 
differences … it has become something of a catch-all concept, in danger of losing its 
analytical utility” (Theobald 1982: 554, 555). 
Indeed, reviewing the current African Studies literature one obtains the impression that 
neopatrimonialism is widely accepted; and in some instances it enters an argument as a deus 
ex machina. Yet the place of neopatrimonialism in African Studies is somewhat unclear. Most 
often the concept is used affirmatively (and uncritically), although there is a more critical 
attitude in the informal circles of university lecture halls and in the seminar rooms of the 
conference and workshop circuit. Only a few scholars of the “radical political economy 
school” share our concerns about the uncritical use of the concept (Olukoshi 1999: 458). 
Based on a different methodological understanding of the state, they do not discuss the con-
cept, but repudiate it fundamentally. Their criticism comes down to the reproach that it is 
part of the “neo-liberal project” as an ideological justification for the current onslaught on the 
state (Olukoshi 1998: 14, Beckman 1993: 21 f., Mustapha 2002).2  
The aim of this article is to address these conceptual lacunae. We will argue that despite the 
indiscriminate use of neopatrimonialism, and its obvious flaws, it is a concept that does make 
sense if it is properly defined. 
This article is broadly structured as follows. We will begin with a critique of how the concept 
has been generally used in the past. The literature on “patrimonialism” and “neo- 
patrimonialism” will be revisited as far as the use in Development Studies in general or Afri-
can Studies in particular is concerned. We will concentrate on significant publications only 
(signified by later references in the neopatrimonialism discourse itself, i.e. by the academic 
notion of “importance”) and deal with these publications in chronological sequence to high- 
                                                      
2  We try to see it rather as an analytical tool that might be useful to get a better understanding of 
state structures, and, if the diagnosis is right, our political conclusion would certainly not be to 
weaken the state, but to strengthen the legal-rational bureaucracy and its capacity to implement 
policies and protect them against private intervention. Beyond the polemical and ideological dust 
of reproaches and sweeping statements that something is “wrong”, it is difficult to find out what 
precisely they think is wrong with the concept, although it is clear that they have a particular un-
derstanding of the state as based on social relations, particularly on class relations. In his more de-
tailed critique of “neo-patrimonialism” Mustapha (2002) criticizes only Bayart (1989, engl. 1993) 
and Bayart/Ellis/Hibou (1999), which is indeed a particular “strand in the neo-patrimonialist litera-
ture on Africa” to which we would not subscribe either as will become obvious below. He points 
out a number of Bayart’s et al. conceptual weaknesses, but to our knowledge they do not use the 
term “neo-patrimonialism”. Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  7 
light in detail old conceptual problems and their recurrence today. This is not to deny that 
there are interesting case studies making use of Weberian concepts of political domination, 
for instance on “patrimonial” Zaire.3  
We will then move on to present our definition and understanding of the concept. Finally we 
address four key conceptual questions which are related to the operationalisation of 
“neopatrimonialism” in empirical research:  
1.  How does neopatrimonialism relate to classical typologies of political regimes? 
2.  How can neopatrimonialism be delimited vis-à-vis the concepts “clientelism” and 
“patronage”? 
3.  Is there a political economy of neopatrimonialism? 
4.  How can neopatrimonialism be “measured”? By way of conclusion we will discuss 
the theoretical status of “neopatrimonialism” and sketch some avenues for their con-
ceptualisation. 
 
 
2. “Patrimonialism” and “Neopatrimonialism” Revisited 
The literature on patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism is closely related to the reception of 
the writings of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), in particular his Economy and 
Society. Weber’s political sociology is based on two primary concepts: “domination” and “le-
gitimacy”. He also established three ideal (or pure) types of domination “according to the 
kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each” (Roth 1978: XXXIX). Thus, Weber singled 
out three types of authority: legal, traditional, and charismatic. The early reception of Weber 
in Development Studies focused on the third of these: charismatic domination (e.g. Aké 
1966). Influenced by the fusion of social-anthropological concepts and sociological function-
alism, the second type (traditional authority) started to attract attention by the end of the 
1960s. Under this form of domination 
                                                      
3  For example, in critical contrast to Willame (1972) who explains Zairian politics with reference to 
Weber’s original patrimonialism concept, Callaghy (1984) in his work on Zaire employs Weber's 
notion of “bureaucratic patrimonialism”. He labels Mobutu’s Zaire a “patrimonial-bureaucratic 
state that is engaged in a state formation struggle with, among others, local patrimonial interests” 
(1984: 75). According to Callaghy Zaire is the African version of an absolutist state, “an early mod-
ern form of organist-state authoritarianism” (1984: 19), but not a modern state (which, according to 
Callaghy, is characterised by the central role of bureaucratic administration) – hence the lack of de-
bate on any “neo”; for our understanding of the concept see below section “Neopatrimonialism re-
defined”. Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  8 
“obedience is owed not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of 
authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional master” (Weber 
1978: 227).  
Conceptualizing political power in Africa in terms of charisma did not prove to be very fruit-
ful. The next wave of Weber reception, therefore, turned towards another of Weber’s con-
cepts of traditional domination, that of “patrimonialism”. As Eisenstadt (1973) argued, 
“patrimonialism” explicitly constituted a “critical attitude to some of the assumptions of the 
first studies of modernisation and political development” (ibid.: 8). With a view to accounting 
for the obvious lack of “modernisation” or “development” in sub-Saharan Africa, different 
notions of patrimonialism, patronage or clientelism were employed (cf. Roth 1968, Lemar-
chand and Legg 1972). This discourse was always closely linked to debates about patronage 
and clientelism (cf. Powell 1969, 1970, Weingrod 1968, Scott 1969, and, for Africa, Zollberg 
1969), which became the orthodoxy of the 1970s and early 1980s. To our knowledge, Eisen-
stadt (1973) was the first who used the term “neo-patrimonialism” with the additional adjec-
tive “modern” as distinct from “traditional patrimonialism”. On this basis, Médard (1982) 
and others developed the term. The most recent wave of Weber reception, since the mid-
1990s, was concerned with the drawbacks of democratic transitions experienced in the 1990s 
(Bratton & van de Walle 1994, 1997, Chabal & Daloz 1999) or the emergence of “hybrid re-
gimes” (Erdmann 2002a, 2000b). At the same time, scholars tried to make sense of Africa’s 
continued economic crisis by referring to “neopatrimonialism” (cf. Englebert 2000, van de 
Walle 2001). Over the years, the connotation of the term has changed. While in the 1970s 
“patrimonialism” was employed in terms of social capital as a way of explaining political 
cohesion in African societies (Theobald 1982: 555), today “neopatrimonialism” is regarded as 
a functional threat to the peaceful political development of African states and the develop-
ment of societies in general. We will now turn to some of the contributions in more detail. 
The debate on “patrimonialism” was reopened in 1968 by Roth. He took the position that it 
had been ignored for far too long and that it could, in many instances, replace the widely 
used and more familiar concept of charisma and charismatic domination.4 Roth (1968) dis-
tinguished between “traditionalist patrimonialism” and “personal rulership” (in the sense of 
detraditionalised, personalised patrimonialism) which Theobald (1982: 549) in his review of 
Roth turned into “modern patrimonialism”. A decade and a half later, in his Max Weber Lec-
                                                      
4  For the translation of the German term Herrschaft as in “Types of Domination”, i.e. “Typen der 
Herrschaft” (Weber 1980: 122), we use “domination”, not “authority”, which was used by Parsons 
alternately with “imperative co-ordination”, or by Roth and Wittich who used it alternating with 
“domination” (Weber 1947, 1978). When we are specifically concerned about a governance relation 
(ruler–ruled), we use the term “rule”. For a more detailed discussion of the proper translation of 
Herrschaft see Mommsen (1974a: 72). Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  9 
tures in Heidelberg, Roth (1987: 18) used the term “neopatrimonialism” explicitly as a syno-
nym for “personal rulership” or “particularistic personal rulership”, as distinguished from 
“universalistic personalism” which prevails in societies such as the United States. For Roth 
(1968: 196), “personal rulership” operates “on the basis of loyalties that do not require any 
belief in the ruler’s unique personal qualifications, but are inextricably linked to material 
incentives and rewards’. Although personal rulership is an ineradicable component of the 
bureaucracies in industrialised countries, in the new states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
it is the dominant form. The crucial point is that there is a difference between traditionalist 
patrimonialism and personal rulership. Firstly traditionalist patrimonialism differs “from 
charismatic rulership in that the patrimonial ruler need to have neither personal charismatic 
appeal nor a sense of mission”. Secondly, it differs “from legal-rational bureaucracies in that 
neither constitutionally regulated legislation nor advancement on the basis of training and 
efficiency need be predominant in public administration” (ibid.). This notion of “personal 
rulership” – different from Jackson and Rosberg’s (1984) “personal rule” which gained a neu-
tral, rather patrimonial characterisation based on Machiavelli's “Prince” and with little “sys-
temness” – might come some way close to our conceptualisation of neopatrimonialism in 
which we emphasise the co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic elements 
(see below). Roth failed, however, to indicate in what way these two elements are related to 
each other. He described what “personal rule” is not, but did not say what it is. His emphasis 
on the personal element – not as a feature of personal relations, but rather fixed on the ruling 
person – is not sufficient to explain the continuous features and internal dynamics of these 
regimes. The most crucial point is that Roth turned “personal rule” or “neopatrimonialism” 
into a feature which can be found in any society. In his usage it becomes an element of any 
political system; an element that can appear in any other kind of rule. The implication is that 
neopatrimonialism is not a form of domination by itself, but only part of all sorts of political 
regimes. This takes him to the point where he warns that “patrimonial” is not to be equated 
with “authoritarian rule”:  
“The latter term has been useful in establishing a continuum ranging from pluralistic 
democracy to totalitarism; the former category properly belongs to a typology of be-
liefs and organisational practices that can be found at any point of such a continuum” 
(Roth 1968: 197; reiterated 1987: 19 f).  
This touches upon a central problem of fleshing out the meaning of “neopatrimonial rule” 
(which we will discuss later): how does neopatrimonial domination relate to the typology of 
political regimes? We cannot but disagree with the idea that “neopatrimonialism” runs 
across all types of political regimes.  Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  10 
It should also be noted that in his analysis of the relationship between “neopatrimonialism” 
and “clientelism” Roth took a quite unique turn. While clientelism is often equated or incor-
porated into “neopatrimonialism” as a component of the latter, he defined “neopatrimonial-
ism” as an even narrower concept than clientelism. In his understanding, clientelism pro-
vides a traditional legitimation to the patron-client relation that is missing in the neopatri-
monial patron-client relation (1987: 18).  
René Lemarchand and Keith Legg (1972) approached the problem from the perspective of 
clientelism. Within their typology of clientage systems – feudal, patrimonial5 and industrial 
clientage – the patrimonial-clientage system, “patrimonialism”, takes two possible forms: 
“In one, the traditionalistic variant, the patron-client relationship permeates the entire 
political system. … In the second, the modernizing patrimonial system, the greater rate 
and extent of social mobilization lead to potential discontinuities in the set of patron-
client relationships, not only between different levels of governmental authority but 
between different sectors as well” (1972: 166-167). 
According to this part of the definition, the difference between the two patrimonial systems 
seems to be the rupture of the all embracing patron-client relationship.6 Several questions 
remain. Firstly, it does not seem entirely clear what replaces the patron-client relationships. 
Secondly, to which degree are these relationships replaced? Are they still dominant or only 
to a lesser degree? Thirdly, where are these relationships replaced? The implication is not 
very satisfying: “Social mobilization”, which as a very general term does not explain much. 
Hence, it leads to only “potential discontinuities”. It remains open as to what exactly will 
take the place of the now pushed aside patron-client relations. One can only assume that it 
will be some “modern” form social relations or, as can be interfered from the suggested crite-
ria for distinguishing between different types of clientage systems, “the formal governmental 
structures” (ibid.: 159). In addition, there is further ambiguity created by the implicit sugges-
tion that relations between rulers and ruled might not exclusively be determined by “patron-
age networks”. 
Another problem with Lemarchand and Legg’s approach is that they distinguish between 
two interrelated “sectors” within society, a “modern” and a “traditional” one. On the inter-
play between the two worlds, they write:  
                                                      
5  They altered the Weberian sequence – which is patrimonial, feudal, industrial – where feudal is a 
particular subtype of patrimonial domination. Whereas Weber might be somewhat ambivalent 
here (in Economy and Society), the sequence is clearly that patrimonial comes first and feudal second 
whether as a subtype or not (Weber 1980: 136-137, 148). 
6  A further quotation might be helpful: “The fundamental distinction, however, is between state 
structures which coincide with, and replicate, the client-patron relationship with the state acting as 
the major source of “prebends”, and state structures which are superimposed upon patronage 
networks, with the latter acting as intermediary links between rulers and ruled” (ibid.: 168). Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  11 
“Precisely the change is restricted to specific sectors, mobilization is uneven and a hia-
tus tends to develop between the clientelistic structures inherited from the previous 
model and incipient ‘legal-rational’ orientations of leading members of the mobilized 
sector. Despite the growing differentiation of the social, economic, and political 
spheres, the expansion of bureaucratic structures, the emphasis on welfare values and 
secularization — social change at the mass level tends to lag far behind the structural 
changes effect at the center. Thus, in its actual operation, the system constantly tends to 
swing back in to the clientelistic mold of its predecessor. The result is a hybrid situation 
in which clientelism resuscitates itself in the traditionalistic interstices of the moderniz-
ing polity” (ibid.: 167). 
This kind of dichotomy is not really helpful, not even for analytical purposes, because there 
are no such distinct worlds. To the contrary, in our understanding there is always a mixture 
of both: clientelism exists not only in the “traditional interstices” and the “traditional periph-
ery” but also in the “modern center” itself, which itself is not so modern, but very much 
tainted by, and interwoven with, “traditional” elements. In other words, Lemarchand and 
Legg’s conception misses, above all, the closely interwoven texture of patrimonial and legal-
rational bureaucratic domination – something that we believe is essential.  
Finally, the analysis offered is somewhat vague about the difference between modernising 
patrimonial clientage systems and industrial clientage systems: “the line of demarcation … is 
highly arbitrary: all industrial systems share some aspects of modernisation as do most con-
temporary modernizing societies” (ibid.: 168).  
The implication is – probably not intended, but implicitly offered – that we demarcate an 
industrial or a modernizing patrimonial clientage system. This form of indetermination is 
highly unsatisfying. Further, Lemarchand and Legg did not address the conceptual relation-
ship between the clientage systems and different political regimes. Their concern is whether 
clientage systems contribute to modernisation or not, and since they are sceptical towards a 
modernising role of clientelism one can assume that they will not attribute it any positive 
contribution towards the development of democracy. 
When we turn to Eisenstadt’s (1973: 12, 59 f.), we find an attempt to justify the use of the term 
“patrimonial” to the analysis of modern political systems. He argued that many modern politi-
cal systems have developed specific characteristics which are different from “the nation state” 
or “revolutionary models of modernity”. Yet he did not provide a definition of modern 
neopatrimonialism or – as he sometimes used it – “modern patrimonialism”. Eisenstadt did, 
however, identify three specific characteristics in which neopatrimonial systems differed from 
proper “modern” models: Firstly, the “distinctiveness” of “the centre and of its relations to the 
periphery”, secondly “the definition of boundaries”, and thirdly “the pattern of political or-
ganisation, struggle and change within them” (ibid.: 13). He then describes these “characteris-
tics” at great length but often in very abstract terms. A frequently used expression is “ten-Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  12 
dency” or “to tend”, which in the end makes it quite difficult to identify the core argument, 
apart from the very general statement that these systems are different (ibid.: 14). 
In our understanding, the point of the “distinctiveness of the centre” comes down to the ar-
gument of the “modern center” and the “traditional periphery”, and the “incomplete pene-
tration and modernisation”. Hence, the characteristic “pattern of political organisation, 
struggle and change within them” translates into nothing else but a “trend” to authoritarian 
rule (ibid.: 15), co-optation, factionalism, and clientelism, and all sorts of elitist policies. 
Eisenstadt described these various phenomena, however, without bringing them into a sys-
tematic order. He failed, in particular, to explain how they are interrelated. 
While Eisenstadt made it very clear that the term patrimonialism is very useful for the analy-
sis of modern societies, albeit appended with the prefix “neo-” or the adjective “modern”, he 
skipped the crucial relationship between patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domi-
nation. In fact, he did not treat the problem of administration and bureaucracy at any length. 
Instead, by finally explaining the major differences between “traditional and modern patri-
monial [i.e. neopatrimonial] political regimes” he identified, the types of problems and de-
mands with which they have to cope, and differences in the patterns of political organisation 
– with a trend “to more complex, bureaucratic or party organisations in the modern ones” 
(ibid.: 60).  
In contrast to all the works discussed above in which a universalistic approach to neopatri-
monialism is taken, Victor T. Le Vine (1980) tried to adapt the concept to Africa. He em-
ployed Roth’s concepts and distinctions of traditional patrimonialism and modern personalist 
patrimonialism (i.e. personal rulership) – the latter is also called “neopatrimonialism”. Le 
Vine’s contribution to the debate was the idea of a particular variant of patrimonialism, 
namely an “African patrimonialism”. Le Vine claims that a specific African character of 
patrimonialism was that “traditional African reality has always been closer to a diffuse 
patrimonialism than to patriarchy” (ibid.: 658). The attempt to broaden the analysis of patri-
monialism by linking it to a Weberian understanding of the term in fact had a rather con-
stricting effect. In his view, Weber’s concept of patrimonialism was too close to patriarchy, 
which is of very little importance to African societies. Le Vine also insisted on the continuity 
between the traditional patrimonialism and the modern variant.  
In our view, this interpretation of Weber is not very convincing nor is his argument in favour 
of the African patrimonialism at this stage.7 In the end, Le Vine’s African neopatrimonialism 
                                                      
7  Even if his interpretation of Weber is plausible, an African patrimonialism as a culturally based 
subtype would only make sense if there were additional subtypes such as an Asian, European, 
French or Russian patrimonialism.  Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  13 
is hardly anything more than a variation on Roth’s concept with the emphasis on personal-
ism, i.e. a fixation on the person at the top.  
“What is novel about ‘neo-patrimonial’ régimes is the extent to which personalism 
plays a significant role, a development that owes as much to the introduction of im-
ported political structures, ideologies, and behaviours, as anything else” (ibid.: 666).  
The final discussion of the “possible relationship between African political instability and 
African varieties of patrimonialism” (which are not mentioned, but seem to signify different 
empirical observations) is unfortunately too short in order to make any clear contribution.  
In a short “Research Note”, Theobald pointed out a number of shortcomings in the debate on 
patrimonialism, some of which we have reviewed as well. In particular Theobald notes that 
as a result the concept looses any analytical utility (Theobald 1982: 555). In order to overcome 
this situation, he also suggests that in using a Weberian framework we need to determine the 
fundamental difference between a patrimonial and a legal-rational bureaucracy, a distinction 
which is, indeed, not all that clear in the neopatrimonialism literature (see below).8 However, 
with reference to Wertheim (Theobald 1980: 556), Theobald compared the bureaucracies of 
developing countries with bureaucracies of “pre-modern empires”. He then concluded:  
“A patrimonial bureaucracy thus is the administrative instrument of an underdevel-
oped economy: that is to say, a primarily agrarian economy with limited trade and a 
large subsistence sector” (ibid.: 557). 
Given that Theobald’s argument is closely modelled on Weber, it has to be pointed out that 
Weber himself did indeed use the term “patrimonial bureaucracy”. But he gave it a totally 
different meaning,9 and one which does not at all fit the African context in the second half of 
the twentieth century. Apart from this terminological misconception, the basic problem re-
mains of the differences between old imperial bureaucracies and that of contemporary 
neopatrimonialism, and of legal-rational bureaucratic rule. 
While Lemarchand and Legg conflated clientelism and patrimonialism, Médard (1982: 165) 
saw clientelism and neopatrimonialism as two competing models for explaining the “politics 
of underdevelopment”. For him, the concept of clientelism is far too narrow to encompass all 
the diverse practices of the underdeveloped state. Nepotism, corruption, tribalism (or ethnic-
ity), and clientelism were said to be constitutive elements of the underdeveloped state, or as 
we would prefer to say, of politics in a neopatrimonial state. Médard’s conclusion is unam-
                                                      
8  See footnote 23. 
9  Weber referred to “patrimonial bureaucracy” as a particular form of bureaucracy, and in European 
history quite an early one, which is based on unfree officials such as “slaves or ministeriales” (de-
pendents or bondsmen; German: Ministeriale; Weber 1978 [1968]: 221 or 1980: 127).  Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  14 
biguous: the concept of neopatrimonialism “best expresses the logic of political and adminis-
trative behaviour in Africa” (ibid.: 185):  
“It has the advantage of including political clientelism, while placing it in its general 
context. … The notion of the privatization of public affairs, which is at the core of the 
concept of neopatrimonialism, is common to all the elements we have reviewed. … 
This privatization of the public has two consequences: the first is that political power, 
instead of having the impersonal and abstract character of legal-rational domination, 
specific to the modern state, is on the contrary personal power” (ibid.: 185, 181).10 
There is, however, some ambiguity in the formulation, which we have not been able to solve 
here. Does this mean that all political power is personal power? Are all public affairs priva-
tised in Africa? 
The problem with Médard’s formulation is, that it overemphasises personal power and pri-
vatisation. If all political power is personal power and all public affairs are privatised, then 
we are back to patrimonialism, albeit in a “modern environment” (whatever that means) in 
order only to justify the prefix of “neo”. This one sided perspective or ambivalence could be 
related to Médard’s notion of “bureaucracy” or his understanding of the combination of 
patrimonialism and bureaucracy in the case of “bureaucratic empires and absolute monar-
chies” (Médard 1982: 179). Again, Médard referred to some interpreters of Weber like Eisen-
stadt (1973), Bendix (1967) or Schwartzman (1976). Weber, indeed, discussed “patrimonial 
bureaucracy”, although in a way that is completely at odds from with a legal-rational bu-
reaucracy (see the discussion of Theobald’s concept).11 
In his introduction to “Politics in the Third World” Clapham (1985) provided a short defini-
tion which in a sense comes close to our understanding. According to Clapham, neopatrimo-
nialism is, 
“a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a 
political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal 
lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are 
formally defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public 
service but of private property. Relationships with other likewise fall into the patrimo-
                                                      
10  The second consequence, which shall not be omitted, is “... that politics becomes a kind of business, 
as it is political resources which give access to economic resources: politics is reduced to economics 
and recovers the depersonalized character inherent in the market” (ibid.). 
11  This ambivalence is reinforced by Médard’s statement that the legal-rational components or postu-
lates or pretensions of the state in Africa show a legal-rational public façade behind which patri-
monialism hides (Médard 1982: 181). In other words: “In neopatrimonial societies, although the 
state is a façade, compared to what it pretends to be, it is not only a façade, for it is able to extract 
and distribute resources” (ibid.: 180). The latter provokes the question whether one really needs a 
state for extraction and distribution of resources – or whether this cannot be done without a state? So 
why do they need this façade? The misconceived representation of the post-colonial state as a façade re-
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nial pattern of vassal and lord, rather than the rational-legal one of subordinate and 
superior, and behaviour is correspondingly devised to display a personal status, rather 
than to perform an official function” (Clapham 1985: 48). 
He continues with empirical details of the possible behaviour of officials in order to demon-
strate to readers unfamiliar with Third World politics how the system works. As this book is 
written as an introductory textbook, Clapham did not elaborate on the problems, but contin-
ued with a discussion of corruption and patron-client relations as elements and products of 
this kind of system. 
If we turn to some more recent contributions, which are based either in historical institutional-
ism (Englebert 2000)12 or in sociological institutionalism (van de Walle 2001, Bratton & van de 
Walle 1997), we find that the space has been opened up for a more precise understanding of 
neopatrimonialism. For instance, in their seminal work “Democratic Experiments in Africa” 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) were the first ones to define neopatrimonialism as clearly 
distinct from patrimonialism. They demarcated the two types of domination (though stating, 
not quite correctly, but politely, that this reflects a general understanding in political sci-
ence): 
“to characterise as neopatrimonial those hybrid regimes in which the customs and pat-
terns or patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (Bratton 
& van de Walle 1997: 62). 
However, when Bratton & van de Walle turned to characterising or operationalising the con-
cept by using the informal institution of “presidentialism” as the first variable, the concept 
becomes ambiguous. In a clear deviation from the general and well established use of the 
term in political science, Bratton and van de Walle defined “presidentialism” in a very spe-
cial way: “one individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making 
tasks” (ibid.: 63). Yet, presidentialism usually refers to a democratic regime headed by a 
president as opposed to a parliamentary democracy (Linz 1994, Lijphart 1994, Sartori 1994). 
Apart from the somewhat unfortunate definition, the phrasing puts almost everything at the 
discretion of personal (or privatised) rule which is not circumscribed by any rules or law. 
Essentially this converts “neopatrimonialism” into “patrimonialism” – or at least comes very 
close to it. What was gained in the definition was lost in the operationalisation. 
More recently, Chabal and Daloz (1999) utilised the concept of neopatrimonialism with ex-
plicit reference to the Weberian tradition, the work of Eisenstadt (1973) and Médard (1982), 
but did not take into account Bratton and van de Walle’s contribution. Although they were 
not completely satisfied with this tradition, they failed to explain why. In the end, Chabal 
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and Daloz outlined their own understanding of the state in Africa. And again, their interpre-
tation of Médard came closer to patrimonialism than to neopatrimonialism:  
“From the neopatrimonial perspective, the state is simultaneously illusory and sub-
stantial. It is illusory because its modus operandi is essentially informal [their empha-
sis] … It is substantial because its control is the ultimate prize for all political elites: in-
deed it is the chief instrument of patrimonialism” (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 9). 
The obvious question is: When the modus operandi is essentially informal, what is the mode of 
patrimonialism and what is then “neo-” about this patrimonialism (for in our understanding 
patrimonialism is informal)? Of course, Chabal and Daloz pose this question themselves, but 
the answer is not very convincing in particular because “the operation of a political system is 
no longer entirely ‘traditional’” (ibid.). The question that follows is, then, what is the other non-
traditional operation of the political system? The argument continued stating that “the political 
legitimacy derives from a creatively imprecise interaction between what might be termed ‘an-
cestral’ norms and the logic of the ‘modern’ state” (ibid.). Still, the conceptual problem re-
mains. From where exactly does the “logic of the modern state” come in when the state is 
“illusory”, “essentially” governed by informal rules, the “instrument of patrimonialism”? 
Chabal and Daloz conclude by offering their own interpretation of the African state: 
“… in most African countries, the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade 
masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations. … In Western Europe 
the Hobbesian notion of the state led to the progressive development of relatively 
autonomous centres of power, invested with sole political legitimacy. In Black Africa … 
such legitimacy is firmly embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons and their 
networks” (ibid.: 16). 
So we are left with a “pseudo-Western façade” which is not even a proper Western façade (as 
opposed to Médard’s rational-legal public façade; 1982: 180, 181). In conclusion, it seems that 
Chabal and Daloz’ concept of the African state is, to a large extent, based on an understand-
ing of patrimonialism rather than neopatrimonialism. 
Where does this leave us? The shortcomings in the current use of the concept are obvious. 
Firstly, neopatrimonialism appears to be used as a catch-all concept “in danger of losing its 
analytical utility” (Theobald 1982: 555). In addition, as Le Vine has pointed out, it has con-
ceptual limitations. “The idea is useful as an organising concept, but much less so as an ana-
lytic guide” (Le Vine 1980: 663). Thirdly, neopatrimonialism per se does not give us a handle 
on differences in time and geography. A fourth problem has been described by Clapham. By 
focusing on sub-conceptual variables such as clientelism one “may be led to exaggerate the 
importance, in the overall scheme of things, of those relationships which it is best able to 
illuminate” (Clapham 1982: 32). Fifthly, research based in the neopatrimonialism discourse Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  17 
faces a problem of sources and has to cope with a major methodological challenge for em-
pirical research (which we will address under “Neopatrimonialism and Political Regimes”). 
 
 
3 Neopatrimonialism  Redefined 
All the attempts to define neopatrimonialism (or “modern patrimonialism”) deal with, and 
try to tackle, one and the same intricate problem: the relationship between patrimonial 
domination on the one hand and legal-rational bureaucratic domination on the other, i.e. a 
very hybrid phenomenon. All those authors who contributed substantially to the debate 
were well aware of this conceptual tension. Chabal and Daloz (1999: 9) acknowledged that 
the neopatrimonial approach “seeks to make sense of the (real or imaginary) contradictions 
to be found in the state in sub-Saharan Africa” – and we would like to add: they are more 
“real” than “imaginary”. Various authors gave different weight to it, but almost all failed to 
sufficiently elaborate on the constituting elements of this form of hybrid structure.13 In this, 
the tendency is to minimise the legal-rational bureaucratic aspect and push the concept too 
far towards patrimonialism. This, we argue, is mistaken. In other words, the problem is that 
the conceptualisation of neopatrimonialism must account for both types of domination. As 
indicated above, only Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) accommodated the two elements of 
these different types of domination into their definition. They failed, however, to operation-
alise it adequately. It is our contention that a proper conceptualisation of neopatrimonialism 
equal treatment to both dimensions of neopatrimonialism has to be taken into account from 
the very start. The term clearly is a post-Weberian invention and, as such, a creative mix of 
two Weberian types of domination: of a traditional subtype, patrimonial domination, and le-
gal-rational bureaucratic domination. We have to elaborate a little on this point before we can 
turn to our definition. 
An understanding of politics in Africa which depicts all official relations as privatised or the 
modus operandi as being essentially informal does not reflect African realities. What we want 
to emphasise here is that there is more than a legal-rational façade. It is a daily experience 
that not all political and administrative decisions are taken according to informal rules de-
termined by private or personal gusto. The distribution of jobs, administrative careers, as 
well as credits and licenses is also exercised according to fixed procedures, rules, and laws 
that follow the formal procedure of a legal rationality. This is not to deny that at the same 
time quite a number of jobs, promotions, credits and licenses are distributed according to 
                                                      
13  We are not talking about a “hybrid state”, a term with which Chabal and Daloz (1999: 9-10) tried to 
catch Bayart’s (1989, 1993) approach to the problem which “stresses the success of the rise of a 
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private discretion. If we talk about the invasion of the informal personal relations into the 
formal structures of legal-rational relations, we actually presuppose there is something to 
invade.14 The implication, of course, is that for analytical purposes we have to take the formal 
institutions of the state, its legal-rational bureaucratic components more seriously in the con-
struction of our concept. 
Now to our definition, which we give in the most simplest way as a derivation from Weber’s 
concepts of patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy (Weber 1978: 217 ff., 231 ff. 1070 ff.; 
1980: 124 ff., 625 ff.). Neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two, partly interwoven, types of 
domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. 
Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as ad-
ministrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private 
and the public realm. However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the pri-
vate and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be 
made to this distinction (it is a different matter whether this is observed or not). Neopatri-
monial rule takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bu-
reaucracy or “modern” stateness. Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice, 
the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed. In other words, two 
systems exist next to each other, the patrimonial of the personal relations, and the legal-
rational of the bureaucracy. Naturally these spheres are not isolated from each other; quite to 
the contrary, they permeate each other; or more precisely, the patrimonial penetrates the 
legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions, and effects. That is, informal politics in-
vade formal institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in 
various ways and by varying degrees; and this particular mix becomes institutionalised as 
suggested by Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 63).
  
Neopatrimonialism is, then, a mix of two types of domination. Elements of patrimonial and 
legal-rational bureaucratic domination penetrate each other. The distinction between the pri-
vate and the public sphere formally exists, but in the social and political practice it is often not 
observed. Thus, two role systems or logics coexist, the patrimonial of personal relations and 
the bureaucratic of impersonal legal-rational relations. The patrimonial system penetrates the 
legal-rational system and affects its logic and output, but does not take exclusive control over 
                                                      
14  If all or almost all decisions would be taken according to personal interest the consequence would 
be that (1) all officials would be corrupt, (2) most jobs would go to unqualified people, (3) hardly 
anything would be left that could be labeled a legal-rational bureaucracy, but everything would be 
arbitrary, with the result that (4) after a couple of years or decades hardly anything would be 
working in Africa. This, however, is only part of the reality – despite the gloomy situation which 
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the legal-rational logic. Ideally people have a certain degree of choice as to which logic they 
want to employ to achieve their goals and realise their interests best.15 
Thus neopatrimonialism is a type of political domination which is characterised by insecurity 
about the behaviour and role of state institutions (and agents). This insecurity structures the 
reproduction of the system: 
-  Actions of state institutions or by state agents are not calculable – probably apart for 
the head of the state. All actors strive to overcome their insecurity, but they do so by 
operating on both the formal as well as the informal logic of neopatrimonialism. Ul-
timately, the inherent insecurity is reproduced in a systematic way.16 The relationship 
between the two logics of neopatrimonialism, the formal and the informal, can thus 
be conceptualised as a mutually reinforcing one, as a mutually constitutive cycle of 
reproduction. 
-  Within such a pattern of social and political relations, formal state institutions cannot 
fulfil their universalistic purpose of public welfare. Formal public institutions and the 
politics ascribed to them cannot, therefore, gain sufficient legitimacy. Instead, politics 
and policies are determined by particularistic interests and orientations.  
-  Political informality has gained such a dimension that one can even speak of institu-
tionalised informality. This experience of this specific type of institutionalised infor-
mality (patrimonial mixed with legal-rational) has become so manifest that there is 
good reason to speak of a separate type of political culture. 
Clearly the historical root of neopatrimonial rule in Africa is the colonial legacy. The colonial 
state was never a modern state, but rather a “traditional” one with some of the characteristics 
of old empires. The legal-rational sphere was confined to the centre of power at the colonial 
capital and its reach to the population of European decent and some small immigrant groups. 
The vast majority of the population was under indirect rule, governed by intermediary author-
ity. This was the realm of patrimonial rule, of kings, chiefs, and elders. It was only during a short 
period that lasted hardly a decade after the World War II (during the “second colonial occupa-
tion” [Low & Lonsdale 1976: 12]) that the colonial powers made an effort to build up a legal-
rational bureaucracy that included and extended to some degree Africans. The period was 
too short and the resources too small for there to have been a major and lasting move to an 
“autonomous” legal-rational bureaucratic culture. After independence, with the Africanisation 
of the bureaucracy and the establishment of authoritarian rule, the bureaucracy was extended 
and at the same time challenged and invaded from above and below by informal relationships. 
                                                      
15  A somewhat similar point one could read into Ekeh’s “two publics” (1975). 
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Thus, the state in Africa has always been a hybrid one, a mixture of patrimonial and legal-
rational domination.17 
 
 
4 Conceptual  Elaboration 
In order to avoid the reduction of neopatrimonialism to a fluid catch-all concept which 
looses any heuristic value, a careful conceptual discussion of at least four pertinent problems 
is essential. Firstly, we must delimit neopatrimonialism, clientelism, and patronage. Sec-
ondly, we will address the question of empirical operationalisation of the concept. Thirdly, 
the relation between neopatrimonialism and rent-seeking needs to be explored. And, finally, 
we must examine the position of neopatrimonialism vis-à-vis a typology of political regimes. 
 
Neopatrimonialism, Clientelism and Patronage 
Unlike Médard (1982) who treated clientelism and neopatrimonialism as competing models, 
we conceptualise clientelism together with patronage – like a number of other scholars 
(Eisenstadt 1973, Bratton & van de Walle 1997) – as an integral part of neopatrimonialism. 
Political clientelism evolves as extended and partly changing nets of political client-patron 
relationships.18  Clientelism means the exchange or brokerage of specific services and re-
sources for political support in the form of votes. It involves a relationship between un-
equals, in which the major benefits accrue to the patron; redistributive effects are considered 
to be very limited. The difference between patrimonial and neopatrimonial clientelism is, 
firstly, that the latter is more complex than the former. It is a reiterating patron-client rela-
tion, forming a hierarchy of dominance relations. In neopatrimonialism there are brokers to 
mediate the exchange between the “little man” and the “big man”. While, in patrimonialism 
there is only a direct dyadic exchange relation between the little and big man. Secondly, the 
object of the exchange is different. The transactions are less about the exchange of private or 
personal goods and services but more about the transfer of public goods and services by the 
patron. Although clientelism can be linked to kinship, often it is not. It can be based on some 
kind of “traditional” relations, but it is to be understood as a modern phenomenon, linked to 
                                                      
17  For an extended version of this argument cf. Erdmann 2003: 278 ff. For a discussion also see Engel 
2002. 
18  We make only a very general reference to some major contributions to the debate on clientelism of 
which the most recent of van de Walle (2002) provides an excellent overview and discussion of the 
major political implications of clientelism, although we don’t share his typology of clientelism: trib-
ute, patronage and prebends. See also Powell 1969, 1970, Weingrod 1968, Scott 1969, and, for Africa, 
Zollberg 1969, Lemarchand 1972, and Spittler 1977. Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  21 
the existence of a state. In an African context it is relevant to note that clientele relations are 
relatively unstable. 
For analytical purposes, we distinguish between clientelism and patronage. The latter is the 
politically motivated distribution of “favours” not to individuals but essentially to groups, 
which in the African context will be mainly ethnic or subethnic groups. Clientelism implies a 
dyadic personal relationship between patron and client, while patronage refers to the rela-
tionship between an individual and a bigger group. The difference between clientelism and 
patronage is essentially the distinction between “individual” and “collective goods”; clientel-
ism implies, first of all, an individual benefit (land, office), patronage collective benefits (e.g. 
roads, schools etc.).19 It should not, however, be thought that there is a strong redistributive 
effect from this patronage. What matters instead is that it is symbolic, i.e. the leading politi-
cians or members of the elite are involved in the patronage leverage. The mechanism is usu-
ally based on the following perception and rationality: if one of us is involved, it will be more 
beneficial for us (at least probably so) than if another who is not of our kin and who may 
(probably) not have our interests at heart – at least, much more likely than if others are in-
volved who will not care about us, but about their own kin. Politically, it seems to be more 
important than clientelism itself. Patronage is part of high-level politics and an important 
instrument in creating and maintaining political cohesion, i.e. a coalition of ethnic elites 
which is needed to form and support a government or a political party. In contrast, clientel-
ism concerns individuals and, thus, based on personal relations. It involves the personal 
network of a politician, but it also occurs within and around the bureaucracy on all levels. 
What is the conceptual relationship between neopatrimonialism and political clientelism? 
The answer is “uncertainty”. Political clientelism in both forms is a child of uncertain pros-
pects. A client needs a patron for protection either to avoid something or to assist in gaining 
something which otherwise would not be obtainable. In short, developing a clientelist network 
it is a means to gain protection and to achieve goals in a situation of societal uncertainty cre-
ated by public institutions which may behave in ways that are not calculable. 
Clientelism clearly contributes to the reproduction of the institutional uncertainty that it is 
designed to overcome. For as soon as many actors turn to this means in order to reduce their 
uncertainty, the uncertainty will become more ubiquitous and provoke further investment in 
it. In other words, clientelism is to be understood as an answer to the institutional uncer-
tainty created by neopatrimonial rule. However, the situation created by a widely used clien-
telist strategy is not necessarily one of chaos, because if officials or official institutions are 
confronted with competing clientelistic demands, they can take refuge in the formal rules 
that they are supposed to exercise. It is also important not to forget that there may be circum-
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stances in which the interests of the politically or economically strong are better supported 
by the official legal-rational rules than by informal political relations. The result will be that 
the formal rules will be supported and advanced rather than circumvented and diminished. 
 
“Measuring” Neopatrimonialism 
There are two fundamental problems in operationalising neopatrimonialism, one related to 
sources, the other to questions of measurement (i.e. indicators, variables etc.). As has been 
noted by many scholars who have tried to apply the concept in empirical research, it is very 
difficult to operationalise it. This applies, above all, to the concept and use of clientelism as a 
key element of neopatrimonialism (Lemarchand 1972: 69). Landè (1983: 440 ff.) has noted 
three problems related to comparative research on clientelism: the problems of conceptuali-
sation, observation, and explanation. This means  
1.  we lack basic agreement as to what is to be included in the study of clientelism;  
2.  the “amorphousness”, the “latency” and the “elusiveness” of clientelism concretises 
the problem of observation; and finally;  
3.  the methodological question for the explanation of the existence of clientelism is not 
satisfactorily answered. 
Because the confusion about the terminology has not substantially improved, it is still very 
difficult to deal with clientelism in a comparative research design. The solution to these 
problems is not, as suggested by Lemarchand (1972: 69), to restrict analysis to seemingly 
more clearly institutionalised clientage systems, but to define the methodological equipment 
for doing so.  
Obviously there is a great variety of forms of neopatrimonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa, as 
anyone familiar with the cases of Ghana, Kenya and Congo (Brazzaville) will note – not to 
mention, e.g., the differences between neopatrimonialism in Africa and the Middle East. In 
their important review of Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Snyder and Mahoney (1999: 
112, 118) argue that criteria need to be defined in order to differentiate institutions of patron-
age and core rules (norms) of the political game in neopatrimonial regimes. We need not 
only to be able to clearly delineate neopatrimonial rule and legal-bureaucratic rule, but we 
also must be able to delineate neopatrimonial and patrimonial rule. Moreover, we must be 
able to determine if a regime is neopatrimonial or corporatist. And, finally, we must be able to 
distinguish between different (sub-)types of neopatrimonial rule. 
According to our definition – neopatrimonialism understood as a true mix of patrimonial 
and legal-rational rule – we can start with a very general observation. In a political system 
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legal-rational or formal rules, but also patrimonial or informal ones. The problems start 
when we look for empirical evidence. 
Only a few authors have explicitly addressed this problem. Snyder (1992: 379) identified “an 
extensive network of personal patronage, rather than through ideology or impersonal law” 
which determined the character of neopatrimonial regimes, and stated that the penetration 
of state institutions by these networks “tend to be uneven”. But he did not explain how we 
can establish the existence of an extensive network of personal relations and the degree of 
penetration into state institutions. Theobald (1982) took the issue only a bit further. Based on 
the assumption that there is a vital link between patrimonialism and broader socioeconomic 
factors, he suggested relating specific instances of patrimonialism to “these contextual vari-
ables”. He, however, confined himself vaguely to “three sets of variables” which, apart from 
naming some casually, he did not elaborate further as regards their relationship to each 
other. In fact it remains questionable whether specific instances of neopatrimonialism (or 
patrimonialism in his case) can be linked to a certain size and composition of GDP, etc.20 His 
third set of variables, on the “characteristics of specific bureaucracies” (ibid.: 559), comes 
closer to our approach, although it does not take us any further beyond that we have to look 
for the bureaucracy or the “state structure”. Lemarchand and Legg (1972) offered a number 
of very general variables in order to differentiate between various forms of “clientelism”.21 
Possibly as a result of the very general nature of their variables (e.g. rate of social mobilisa-
tion) it is not really surprising that the literature on neopatrimonialism has made no system-
atic use of their effort. 
More recently, Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 63 ff.) suggested another substantive ap-
proach to the problem. They identified three “variables”, which are said to be the three in-
formal political institutions typical for neopatrimonial regimes: Firstly, “presidentialism” 
which here means the “systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one indi-
                                                      
20  He suggested three sets of variables of which two concern general economic and political features, 
i.e. the size and composition of the GDP, the character of trade and manufacturing, the size of the 
subsistence sector etc.; political factors such as the historical evolution, the character of the state 
structure, the degree of internal political integration, and the “general nature of the relationship be-
tween the political executive and the administration” (Theobald 1982: 559). The idea to find a “cor-
relation” between the size and composition of GDP and a specific feature of patrimonialism 
amounts to the old and very optimistic proposition of the 1960s and 1970s that political rule in 
general or democracy in particular can be linked and explained through specific economic factors. 
This, however, did not hold true.  
21  They formulated “systemic (political) variables” and “sub-systemic (clientage) variables” (Lemar-
chand & Legg 1972: 160-1), such as “differentiation of system boundaries” or “rate and extent of 
social mobilization”. The implicit assumption, based on system analysis (K. W. Deutsch, D. 
Easton), seems that, for instance, a specific urbanisation rate X can explain the particular quality 
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vidual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks”. Secondly, “sys-
tematic clientelism” which implies that the president or “strongman” relies on awarding of 
personal favours, e.g. the distribution of public sector jobs and public resources through li-
censes, contracts and projects, and, thirdly, the “use of state resources for political legitima-
tion” which is closely linked to clientelism. As indicated above, the first problem with this 
approach is that the first variable is not indicative of neopatrimonialism, but of a kind of 
patrimonialism, for everything is left to the discretion of the unrestrained ruler. Another 
problem is that the second variable is underspecified – “use of state resources for political 
legitimation” does not say very much. This is a phenomenon which can be identified in all 
sorts of political regimes. What was meant is simply that political office is used for appropri-
ating public wealth for private enrichment as well as selective patronage. However, it might 
be worthwhile to explore the possibilities of patronage as one indicator for neopatrimonial-
ism some more. The systematic analysis of the distribution of public resources, including 
development projects to particular regions, districts or ethnic (sub-)groups together with the 
distribution of ministerial and other major political and administrative posts, might provide 
an indicative pattern of patronage politics. Apart from that, what is necessary is a dimension 
which allows us to analyse the relationship between the operation of legal-rational and pat-
rimonial rules in the wider sphere of governance. 
Thus we return the distinction of two dimensions of governance, i.e. firstly to the political 
“level” of the elected or nominated officials (politicians) and, secondly, to the administrative 
level of the bureaucracy proper. For the second level, Weber’s characteristics of legal-rational 
bureaucratic rule of the pure type might provide some indicators:22 
1.  Officials are employed on the basis of technical qualifications, i.e. tested by examina-
tion/diploma; and they are appointed, not elected. 
2.  They obtain fixed salaries in money, and for the most part they have a right to pen-
sions. The payment is graded according to rank in the hierarchy. 
3.  The office is the only one for the incumbent or at least the primary occupation.  
4.  The bureaucracy offers a career that is a system of promotion according to seniority 
and/or to achievement. Promotion is dependent on the judgment of superiors. 
5.  Officials are entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and 
without appropriation of his position. 
                                                      
22  We have not named the first four criteria of Weber’s list: “(1) They are personally free and subject 
to authority only with respect to their personal official obligations. (2) They are organized in a 
clearly hierarchy of offices. (3) Each office has clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal 
sense. (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. … in principle, there is free selec-
tion” (Weber 1978: 220). Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  25 
6.  They are governed by strict and systematic discipline and controlled in the conduct of 
the office (Weber 1978: 220 f.).23 
The implication is that we have to separately analyse the two dimensions of governance; 
first, the conduct of political office and, second, the conduct of bureaucratic office. While for 
the first one we can use the well known criteria which allow us to distinguish between au-
thoritarian and democratic governance, for the second one we might use the indicators from 
the above list, although these are clearly not exhaustive. In addition, we have to analyse the 
bureaucracy as it operates. Hence, we have to establish how far the stipulated rules are ob-
served; how the officials concur with their formal obligations of the legal-rational roles; and 
to what extent and with which frequency do they deviate from the conception of their role. 
This should provide an answer to the question to which degree formal bureaucratic behav-
iour is routinised vis-à-vis informal behaviour. 
If we examine more closely the functioning of any bureaucracy we will probably be able to 
detect neopatrimonial remnants in democratic and in hybrid regimes as well. Obviously, this 
needs to be related to the exercise of domination by the supreme authority, the legally 
elected president and his government in general, and how far they are subjected to the rule 
of law etc. The implication here is a concept of democracy which explicitly includes the rule 
of law, or what in German is called Rechtsstaat. By implication, the application of the above 
mentioned criteria to a neopatrimonial bureaucracy will produce negative results, i.e. it will 
be indicative of the existence of non-rational legal principles. Still, we will not be able to un-
derstand what actually is working (rather than describing the absence of legal-rational rule). 
Here the concept of clientelism and/or patronage comes in as it, at least, provides a theoreti-
cal explanation for a number of phenomena which are so difficult to observe empirically. 
 
                                                      
23  As has been indicated above, in general reception of Weber has a problem with the understanding 
of bureaucracy as an administrative staff in general and the specific legal-rational bureaucracy. For 
Weber, legal-rational bureaucracy is only “one category of domination through an administrative 
staff” (Weber 1980: 124; our translation as opposed to Roth’s Weber 1978 [1968]: 222, and Parsons’ 
Weber 1964: 335 identical translation), i.e. one type of bureaucracy that is the “specifically modern 
type of administration” (Weber 1978: 217; 1980: 124). When dealing with traditional domination 
Weber explains what is – in contrast to the pure type of a legal-rational bureaucracy – absent in the 
administrative staff (bureaucracy) of traditional domination: “(a) a clearly defined sphere of com-
petence subject to impersonal rules, (b) rationally established hierarchy [of superiority and inferior-
ity], (c) a regular system of appointment on the basis of free contract, and orderly promotion, (d) 
technical training as a regular requirement, (e) (frequently) fixed [and regularly paid] salaries [ …] 
[more often] paid in money” (Weber 1978: 229; in [ ] our translation, based on Weber 1980: 131). For 
all those familiar with Weber, this clear cut distinction is nothing new. Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  26 
Neopatrimonialism and Rent-seeking 
Initially, the discussion about neopatrimonialism was limited to the politics, but later discus-
sions picked up upon its reciprocal impact on socio-economic development. Lemarchand, for 
instance, discussed the distributive properties of patrimonialism and the likely impact of 
“intervening socio-economic changes” for the “original base” of patronage (1972: 159). He 
also realised that “the pattern of resource allocation prevailing at any given time” constituted 
an important variable in this type of system (ibid.: 83). Based on a hypothetical cost-benefit 
analysis, Clapham expected clientage systems  
“to decline when, over a period, either patrons or clients or both see themselves as no 
longer gaining a benefit from the transaction sufficient to outweigh its costs” 
(1982: 14).24  
In the 1970s, when the focus shifted towards what was conceived as Africa’s failure to de-
velop, the debate went beyond the microeconomics of clientelism and patronage. “Moderni-
sation”, Lemarchand and Legg predicted in 1972, “may simply fail to occur because of the 
excessive volume of demands imposed upon the system via party-directed patronage” 
(1972: 176).  
Médard made a similar point when he stressed that “patrimonialism” distorted economic 
development and, as a concept, “helps explain the inefficiency of the underdeveloped state” 
due to the rising cost of patronage (1982: 169). Both accounts, however, one on the microeco-
nomics of clientelism and the other on the macroeconomic costs of patronage, were not fully 
elaborated. 
Instead, a more specific theme developed with a view to employ the neo-classical economic 
theory of rent-seeking (cf. Krueger 1974) for understanding the relationship between politics 
and economy in Africa during the 1990s. The focus of this approach is on the relevance of 
rents, the development of a culture of rent-seeking, and rentier states. Rents are defined as a 
“premium above opportunity costs for a given set of resources” (Lewis 1994: 440), which is 
when market’s price setting mechanisms are distorted by non-market forces. Rentier activi-
ties are “politically mediated opportunities for obtaining wealth through non-productive 
economic activity” (Boone 1990: 427).25  Rentiers, belonging to the “political class”, gain 
wealth through the privatisation of state resources (loans, property, subsidies, cash transfers 
                                                      
24  Lemarchand and Legg even predicted that “whatever success the clientelistic model may achieve 
in promoting economic and social development must ultimately lead to its disintegration ... in an 
environment of scarcity the struggle is likely to become particularly intense. Violence and chronic 
instability are predictable under these circumstances” (1972: 177, 178, resp.). 
25  See also Gallagher 1991, Boone 1994, and Dillman 2002. Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  27 
etc.), and the appropriation of rents generated by state intervention in markets (government 
contracts, trading in state controlled markets etc.).  
Little consent, however, emerged with regard to the conceptualisation of the exact relationship 
between African politics, the state and the economy. While some adopted the narrow “rentier-
state” terminology for oil-rich states (e.g. Yates 1996 on Gabon), others imagined the “rentier 
economy” (or a “politicised crony capitalism”) linked to a “neopatrimonial state” or a “preben-
dal state” (Lewis 1994). The “prebendal state” was defined as a “congeries of offices susceptible 
to individual cum communal appropriation” (Joseph 1983: 31), translated by Lewis (1994: 440) 
into “essentially a distributive state”. However, there was no explicit reference to rents or rent-
seeking in this concept. The idea was that Africa’s ruling classes did not invest in productive 
activities, but rather privatised state resources for consumptive or prestige purposes. This form 
of accumulation was said to be closely related to strategies of political control which were only 
possible through the “neopatrimonial” or “prebendal” nature of the state. It appears that all 
these terms try to capture the same phenomenon, namely, private appropriation of public re-
sources through public office for non- productive investment. The relation to the rentier econ-
omy as well as terminological differences on the side of the state remains unclear, in particular if 
some of the terms are used as synonyms.  
Irrespective of the terminological differences, empirical evidence suggests that it is plausible 
to assume the existence of a culture of rent-seeking. In this context van de Walle (2001: 285) 
has made the crucial point to discriminate between rent and rent-seeking, while the differ-
ence is most often conflated. Rents can decline while rent-seeking is increasing. Privatisation 
and liberalisation might reduce the amount of rents, but increase rent-seeking as behaviour 
or endeavour to acquire rents. For our purpose, the important question is on the relation be-
tween neopatrimonialism and this culture of rent-seeking. In a Nigerian case study, Lewis 
explicitly described the “mutually reinforcing pattern of neopatrimonial governance and a 
rentier economy” (1994: 438). Van de Walle is not that explicit, but seems to make the same 
point. He says that “the administration is weakened by … patronage and rent-seeking”, on 
the other “low state capacity has facilitated various rent-seeking and corrupt practices” 
(2001: 55, 135). To him Africa’s permanent economic crisis is caused by a “mixture of ideol-
ogy, rent-seeking and low state capacity” (ibid.: 115). Low state capacity in his case is neopat-
rimonial rule.  
A number of questions remain unanswered. First, is the concept of the rentier state an alter-
native to that of the neopatrimonial state? Second, what is the relationship between the con-
cept of the prebendal state, which has no explicit reference to rents, and rent-seeking? And, 
third – this concerns the relationship between neopatrimonialism and rent-seeking – is 
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Rent-seeking as a characteristic of neopatrimonial rule is indeed useful. Firstly it brings eco-
nomic analysis back in. Secondly, and more concretely, it draws attention to a fundamental 
nexus between neopatrimonialism and rent-seeking which we regard as equivalent in role to 
the nexus between neopatrimonialism and uncertainty as outlined above (sect. 3). We have 
stated that the relationship between the logic of neopatrimonialism and the logic of the for-
mal and the informal can be conceptualised as a mutually reinforcing one, as a mutually con-
stitutive cycle of reproduction. In principle, this could also be assumed for the economic side 
of neopatrimonialism. It seems reasonable to presume that a culture of rent-seeking rein-
forces and reproduces neopatrimonialism. From a methodological point of view, we are very 
much in need of more theoretical advancement and empirical investigations. This is sup-
posed to find out how the presumed close interrelationship between rent-seeking and 
neopatrimonialism can be disentangled.  
 
Neopatrimonialism and Political Regimes 
How does neopatrimonialism relate to the classical typology of political regimes? Although 
only a few authors explicitly refer to this question, the exception is Roth (1968), there seems 
to be agreement that neopatrimonial rule belongs to the realm of authoritarian regimes. De-
mocracy is closely linked and dependent on the rule of law and thus dependent on legal-
rational bureaucracy and its rules. Legal-rational domination finds its logical incarnation in a 
democratic framework only. But one has to be aware that only the purest type legal-rational 
bureaucratic domination accommodates democratic rule as well. Germany during the second 
half of the nineteenth century was, for instance, largely governed by a legal-rational bureauc-
racy and the rule of law, although this version of the “rule of law” was not based on human 
rights and definitely not on common democratic rights. Thus authoritarian rule can be com-
bined with legal-rational domination, and does not necessarily equate with neopatrimonial-
ism. This is quite obvious, but has not always been sufficiently observed in the discussion of 
patrimonialism or neopatrimonialism. Bratton and van de Walle (1994) made the very crucial 
point as regards the different outcomes of transitions in different parts of the world: transi-
tions in southern and eastern Europe or even in Latin America departed from authoritarian 
regimes which were corporatist in nature, while authoritarian regimes in African were dis-
tinctly neopatrimonial which provided a major institutional impediment for successful de-
mocratic transitions. The implication here is the necessity for an analytical differentiation 
between two spheres of government (and governance), i.e. the government proper which is 
the sphere of politicians – whether elected, nominated, or self-nominated by force – and that 
of the state bureaucracy and administrative staff. These two spheres or levels of governance 
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The distinction between these two spheres of governance within the legal-rational type of 
domination is perfectly at one with Weber’s concept of rational domination:  
“There are very important types of rational domination which, with respect to the 
[head of administrative staff], belong to other types …; this is true of the hereditary 
charismatic type … and of a pure charismatic type of a president chosen by plebiscite” 
(Weber 1978: 219; 1980: 126; and own translation).  
This means: “at the top of a bureaucratic organisation, there is necessarily an element which 
is at least not purely bureaucratic” (ibid. 1978: 222). Thus, modern ministers or presidents are 
not proper “officials” (Beamte) within the legal-rational bureaucracy which requires technical 
qualifications. To put it differently, there is always a personal moment even in the most ad-
vanced legal-rational bureaucratic domination. This is a fact that preoccupied Roth (1968) 
and which misled him in discerning modern patrimonialism (“personal rulership”) even in 
industrialised societies. In one sense, this personal element is part and parcel of the pure 
type. The crucial difference between the authoritarian and democratic variant is simply that 
the democratically elected leader or head of government (state) is subjected to legal rules 
himself (the rule of law), while the authoritarian ruler is not. Various combinations of the 
form of government and the form of bureaucracy in relation to authoritarian and democratic 
regimes are illustrated in table 1 (below). 
Related to this problem is the reach of neopatrimonial rule. Is such a form of rule confined to 
authoritarian regimes? In many parts of the world, transition from authoritarian rule was 
confronted with the legacy of neopatrimonial institutions (e.g. Central and South-East Asia, 
Central America). Richard Snyder (1992) has pointed out that the transition from neopatri-
monial rule is most likely to result in the continuation of non-democratic rule. These features 
were observed before the “wind of change” reached the shores of most of the neopatrimonial 
regimes in Africa. Many observers of Africa felt that there were only a few successful transi-
tions, but numerous cases for which it is difficult to decide whether they were back to an 
authoritarian regime or not. The reason is that many fundamental principles of democratic 
rule are in place, although in a very chequered manner (e.g. selective observation of human 
rights, but without any gross violations). There seems to be a protracted struggle for democ-
ratisation going on which appears to be an extended transition. In order to deal with this 
problem, some scholars conceptualised a third, hybrid, type of regime which lies between 
the authoritarian and democratic one. In the African case, these can be termed “neopatrimo-
nial multi-party systems” (Erdmann 1998, 2002).26 Others, however, opted for a different so-
lution to the problem and suggested to place these imperfect or flawed democracies as sub-
                                                      
26  For Central America see Karl (1995), for a general theoretical and methodological discussion cf. 
Rüb 2002, and for a critical review of the debate Krennerich 2002. Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  30 
types of democratic rule, such as “delegative”, “illiberal” or “defect” democracies (O’Donnell 
1994, Merkel & Croissant 2000) – all close to authoritarianism.27 
This discussion is yet unresolved; different possibilities to classify regime types in relation to 
form of government and bureaucracy are shown in table 1. The final empirical test for a sepa-
rate “hybrid type” stands out because we are still lacking acceptable conceptual tools to 
categorise empirical cases.28 
 
Table 1: Government and bureaucracy in different regime types 
Regime type  Democratic  Hybrid  Authoritarian 
Sub-type   
Illiberal/ 
defect/ 
deliberate etc. 
Possible  
sub-types 
Bureaucratic  Neo-
patrimonial 
Government  Legal 
Legal 
(personal) 
Legal  
(personal) 
Personal  Personal 
Bureaucracy  Legal-rational 
Neo-
patrimonial 
Neo-
patrimonial 
Legal-rational 
Neo-
patrimonial 
 
 
5 Perspectives 
Neopatrimonialism is a heuristic concept, derived from the works of Weber, for the com-
parative analysis of political domination. We have argued that the discourse on “neopatri-
monialism” has been characterised by several terminological weaknesses which, in the end, 
has given rise to conceptual confusion. In its present use, neopatrimonialism really is in dan-
ger of becoming a catch-all concept. This, we argued, is mainly due to the absence of clear 
definitions which, firstly, allow for a distinction between neopatrimonial and other types of 
domination and, secondly, enable us to apply the concept for empirical research. In addition, 
the literature has lacked a clear delineation between patrimonialism and its “neo” counter-
part. As we have shown, neopatrimonialism has frequently been conflated with patrimonial-
ism and the “neo” prefix has become a synonym for “modern”. 
Yet despite our critical review of major contributions to the debate, we think that the concept 
itself is a very useful one and can be given more substance. This view is based on four rea-
                                                      
27  For a critical review of democracies with an adjective see Collier & Levitzky 1997. For the discus-
sion of the methodological problems involved cf. Krennerich 2002. 
28  On the basis of human rights see Erdmann 2002: 324 and, more detailed, Rüb 2002: 105 ff. Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  31 
sons. Firstly, neopatrimonialism is based on a universal view. Secondly, the concept in prin-
ciple permits comparative analysis. Thirdly, neopatrimonialism systematically links politics 
to the exercise of power or – in Weber’s terminology – “political domination” which is a core 
subject in political science. Fourthly, despite conceptual ambiguities, many studies that use 
the concept have come to far-reaching conclusions. 
In addition to these general reasons, we have tried to elaborate the concept in order to re-
establish its heuristic usefulness, but also to sketch perspectives for advancing the theoretical 
debate. We attempted this, firstly, by redefining the term neopatrimonialism; secondly, by 
setting it off from clientelism and patronage; thirdly, by examining the relationship between 
neopatrimonialism and rent-seeking; and, fourthly, by discussing the operationalisation of 
neopatrimonialism for the purposes of empirical research. The results of this endeavour can 
be summarised as follows: Neopatrimonialism is a mix of two types of political domination. 
It is a conjunction of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. The exercise of 
power in neopatrimonial regimes is erratic and incalculable, as opposed to the calculable and 
embedded exercise of power in universal rules (or, in Weber’s terms, abstrakter Regelhaftig-
keit). Public norms under neopatrimonialism are formal and rational, but their social practice 
is often personal and informal. Finally, neopatrimonialism corresponds with authoritarian 
politics and a rent-seeking culture, whereas legal-rational domination relates to democracy 
and a market economy. 
Against this background, a major conceptual challenge remains. We have tried to demon-
strate that neopatrimonialism can be factored into patrimonial and rational-legal domination, 
connected by a specific interaction. For heuristic purposes this is an advance. Yet, it still 
leaves us with the problem of specificity. We hold that on the basis of our concept of neopat-
rimonialism it should be possible to develop a typology of sub-types of neopatrimonial rule. 
Such a typology would at least be composed of a bureaucratic and a personalistic dimension. 
To identify different features of neopatrimonialism we need empirically observable vari-
ables. As yet we do not have any common indicators for clientelism, patronage or neopatri-
monialism in toto. However, some clearly operationalised variables are essential so as to 
permit at least a “thick description” (dichte Beschreibung, not in the social anthropological 
sense but as a theory-based description) of the phenomena on which a proper comparative 
approach will be possible.29 We simply know too little about how people structure their ac-
                                                      
29  An example for this kind of approach might be Burnell’s (2001) analysis of the “financial indiscip-
line” which gives ample and detailed evidence of how the Chiluba government blocked any at-
tempt to close institutional loopholes for patrimonial politics. An analysis of the set up of the local 
government and the decentralisation policy of the same government in Zambia provides another 
example how a bureaucracy is systematically undermined by patrimonial political maneuvers 
(Crook/Manor 2001).  Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  32 
tions in a neopatrimonial setting, what constitutes choice and what restraint. In the end, the 
neopatrimonial system of rule should be complemented with what we would like to call a 
theory of neopatrimonial action.  Erdmann/Engel: Neopatrimonialism Revisited  33 
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